Sunday, July 22, 2012

Japanese Vs. North American Manufacturing: Management Matters


In the last decade, we saw the DotCom bubble burst and the US housing and financial market collapse, triggering lengthy recessions. Somewhere in-between the good times and the bad, North Americans realized they have to make certain changes in lifestyle; many turned away from the gas-guzzling cars and bought smaller cars, ones that are more reliable, better in quality, and more fuel-efficient. Some turned to the Japanese automakers.

When Toyota entered the North American market in 1984, they brought in more than just Japanese cars, machines, and robots; they also brought in a management system that eventually allowed the company to oust General Motors as world’s #1 automaker in 2008. There is no coincidence in that and Japanese firms’ strong emphasis on quality, detail, and teamwork, of which North American firms fare poorly.

I spent the last few weeks working as a blue collar operating machines on the assembly line of a Japanese-owned factory. Comparing my experiences here with that of working for a North American factory, I notice the subtleties in management practises that might have altered the fate of the companies. Below is an email from the general manager of one of the largest Canadian manufacturer based in Ontario. The letter is sent out to all supervisors-and-above employees to prepare for their Japanese clients’ visit.

AS part of long term planning and securing new business with high demand, but stable and loyal customers, every COMPANY X employee should raise their performance level in every category including 5S. On  June 21st we will have COMPANY J in our plant, and then on June 28th COMPANY K, one of the world leaders in transmission manufacturing and assembly,  from Japan, will stop by in their attempt to find machining source for different transmission components.

We want to present COMPANY X  in the best possible way.
To make it successful we must:
1.      Clean our work area and maintain it spotless.
2.      Fix as many leaks as possible.
3.      Stop leaving footprints everywhere
4.      Make sure that visual aids are available and kept in working order.
5.      Gauge tables must be very clean at any given time.
6.      Every part must be properly tagged and stored on proper location.
7.      Chip bins, outside/inside dunnage , should be placed in assigned areas.
8.      Tire marks, chips on the floor, oil and coolant in aisle way should be cleaned and areas maintain such
9.      Documentation should be up to date  i.e. operator instructions, ODS, gauge instructions, Process specifications etc.

Your cooperation is greatly appreciated.
Thanks
General Manager

From this email, notice the Japanese management’s attention on details. They are not concerned with a company’s quality reports, rather, they assess a company’s corporate practice through littlest things like footprints on the floor.


My experiences working for an Ontario-based Japanese-managed factory agree with the conditions described in the General Manager’s keynotes above. I could not find a single item misplaced at any given time in the work area. Everything at our workstations are properly labeled and organized that it seemed “cute” at first. When it comes to quality, Japanese manufacturers adopted a “just in time” system that allow management to trace every product manufactured to its maker, down to within half-hour of its production. The management study these records constantly to improve quality and efficiency through optimization calculus. Moreover, I was surprised by the level of automation at Japanese factories. They implemented sensors everywhere to eliminate human error. The company does not tolerate quality issues; if a part is accidentally scratched or dropped onto the floor, it is immediately scrapped. They follow the “5S” (sort, straighten, shine, systemize, sustain) methodology to heart. Because they are so attentive to details, Japanese firms achieve quality at every level of production.

Similar system is in place at the North American manufacturer I worked at, but it is never successfully enforced. We talked about quality, but never applied the principle to reality. Faulty parts are shipped anyways despite our knowledge of them. Had this happened in the Japanese factory, we would’ve held a plant-wide lecture on why quality matters. This is a matter of corporate principle. Over time, these organizational problems lead to catastrophic outcomes the way a butterfly creates a hurricane.

Lastly, we have to talk about corporate values. In the business world, corporate values and management abilities set competitive and noncompetitive manufacturers apart. The Japanese management found a way to indoctrinate its core values in each and every worker. When the Japanese top managers walk the floor and talk to assembly line workers, they ask not about technical questions, but how their family is, how their children are doing, whether they will are aware of the dates for the next company barbeque or golf tournament. The same is not true for North American manufacturer. Floor workers are often questioned on what they are doing. A colleague of my was fired on the spot when he failed to answer a technical question.

I know I’ve made the fallacy of sweeping generalization. But I do find merit in looking at the little things. Perhaps this is because this whole “Japanese-management” has gotten into me. I’ve yet to decide whether this is a good thing or not!



One of my work stations

Monday, July 9, 2012

An Economic Model of Leafs Hockey



The accomplishments of NHL General Manager is not easy to assess. Exactly how much of a team's success is owed to the General Manager and how much of it is just pure luck? That's the question we can answer with an economic model of hockey.

Take Pittsburgh Penguins, Chicago Blackhawks, Los Angeles Kings, and compare them with Boston Bruins, Anaheim Ducks, Detroit Red Wings, we have two models of how to win a Stanley Cup. The first group found success through years of "tanking" and accumulation of upper first round picks. The second group secured long-term success through trades and free-agent signing. Certainly the impact of the GM is different in the two groups!

No offense to Oilers GM Tembellini, but with three consecutive 1st overall picks (Hall, Nugent-Hopkins, Yakupov) it's kind of hard to screw up. Therefore, to model the assets of a hockey team, we need to separate a team's natural growth and induced growth in assets.

Since NHL is set up in a way that balances the powers of the teams through draft picks, we can assume a fair game. In other words, all teams will win equal number of Stanley Cups in the long run. What causes the short-term "fluctuation" is the works of the General Managers.

Some groundwork

There are four ways in which a team's assets can increase (or decrease):
1. Draft picks
2. Player development
3. Free-agent signing
4. Trades
(5. Cap space increase)

Even without any trades, a team will see its asset increase naturally; this is because each team is awarded with 7 draft picks each season. Draft picks are commodities that could be traded for other draft picks or players. Each draft pick has a specific value attached to it; the earlier the pick, the higher the probability of selecting an impact player. However, once a draft pick is used to select a player, the draft pick is no longer an asset of the team. Instead, the team gains an asset in a young player. The young player's value is subject to "Player Development".

For instance, Ottawa Senators was awarded the 1st overall pick in the 1993 NHL draft. With the 1st overall pick, the assets of Ottawa Senators increased significantly. But as soon as they selected Alex Daigle, Ottawa lost the value of the 1st overall pick. Instead, they gain a young player in Alex Daigle. And since Alex Daigle never lived up to the expectation of a 1st overall pick, Ottawa's assets decreased.

For the equalization process to work (that all teams are equally competitive in the long-run), we assume GMs have perfect knowledge of players. It is assumed that GMs always select the best player available with their draft picks. This allows us to use draft picks as a benchmark to evaluate a team's assets. The difference between the team's assets and the benchmark evaluates the performance of the GM.

This may sound confusing, but let's use my favourite team Toronto Maple Leafs as an example to clarify things.

When Brian Burke took over the Leafs in 2008, he inherited some assets in players (both in the NHL and AHL). Under natural growth, Leafs gains 4 x 7 = 28 draft picks, one pick in each round of selection from 2009 to 2012. Players, draft picks, and some cap space make up the Leafs' total assets.

In terms of draft picks, Leafs did not miss a single pick from the first three-rounds of selection from 2009 to 2012. This means that Leafs were able to at least grow at the natural rate of growth.

R. Player
1. Kadri
1. Biggs
1. Percy
1. Rielly
2. Blacker
2. Ross
2. Ryan
2. Finn
3. Devane
3. McKegg
3. Olden
3. Leivo
....

Since these assets are added for free and that we assumed the GM always draft the best player available with each pick, Burke cannot take credit for these additions. This is also the reason Tembellini cannot take credit for adding Hall, Nugent-Hopkins, and Yakupov.

Next, let's look at what Burke did with his roster players (stock capital). The list below includes all transactions Burke conducted since his take-over. Any change in asset value would be considered the work of the GM.



Traded away                                                  Received
1st (2010) Seguin
1st (2011) Biggs
1st (2011) Hamilton
1st (2011) Percy
2nd (2010) Knight
2nd (2009)
2nd (2011)
2nd (2009)
3rd (2011)
2nd (2010)
3rd (2012)
2nd (2010)
4th (2010)
2nd (2012)
4th (2012)
3rd (2010)
5th (2010)
3rd (2011)
6th (2010)
4th (2009)
6th (2010)
4th (2010)
7th (2010)
4th (2010)
7th (2011)
4th (2013)
7th (2012)
5th (2010)
Antropov (1st -1998)
5th (2010)
*Beauchmin
6th (2011)
Berry
6th (2011)
Blake
7th (2010)
Earl
7th (2011)
Giliati
7th (2012)
Hagman
Ashton (1st -2009)
Hayes
Colborne (1st -2008)
Kaberle
Deschamp(2nd -2008)
*Kubina
Franson
*Lebda
Gardiner (1st -2008)
*MacDonald
Kessel (1st -2006)
Mayers
Lashoff (1st -2005)
J. Mitchell
Liles 
D. Mitchell
Lombardi
*Moore
Lupul (1st -2002)
Petiot
Phaneuf (1st -2003)
Pogge
Steckel
Ponikarovsky
van Riemsdyk (1st -2007)
Schenn (1st -2008)
*MacArthur 
Slaney
*Komisarek (1st -2001)
Stajan
*McClement (2nd -2001)
Stalberg
*Connolly (1st -1999)
Stapleton
Stefanovich
Stralman
Tlusty (1st -2006)
Toskala
White

Bolded names are roster players
*Picked up through free agency


From the list of players Burke traded away, arguably only a handful are currently regular roster players, most of which are past their prime. In the list of players Leafs acquired, however, most of them are young players yet to reach their full potential. It's also worthwhile to note the players acquired were mostly former 1st or 2nd round picks. Clearly, Leafs assets increased quite significantly under Burke management.

Now, let's factor in "Player Development", which is a form of natural growth (or decline).

Projected Leafs Line-up:

Kessel - van Riemsdyk - Lupul
Kulemin - Grabovski - MacArthur
Frattin - Bozak - Kadri
Steckel - McClement - [Open]

Phaneuf - Liles
Gunnarson - Gardiner
Komisarek - Holzer

Reimer - Scrivens

Many of these roster players are already in the system before Burke arrived. Their values of increased over the years due to their development as hockey players. These values should be accredited to Ferguson and Fletcher.

For a more accurate evaluation of a team's assets, we need a mathematical model that assigns a numerical value to each player, also taking account of his age, potential, and development level. Fortunately, this has been done by EA Sports in the making of its NHL videogames.

Hopefully, now you have a new perspective of the Toronto Maple Leafs and GM Brian Burke.